Pietro Salis, Pratiche discorsive razionali: Studi sull’inferenzialismo di Robert Brandom by Dell’Utri, Massimo
 




Pietro SALIS, Pratiche discorsive razionali: Studi
sull’inferenzialismo di Robert Brandom










Massimo Dell’Utri, « Pietro SALIS, Pratiche discorsive razionali: Studi sull’inferenzialismo di Robert Brandom
 », European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy [Online], XI-1 | 2019, Online since 19 July
2019, connection on 24 September 2020. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/1575  ; DOI :
https://doi.org/10.4000/ejpap.1575 
This text was automatically generated on 24 September 2020.
Author retains copyright and grants the European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy right
of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
Pietro SALIS, Pratiche discorsive
razionali: Studi sull’inferenzialismo di
Robert Brandom
Milano-Udine, Mimesis, 2016, 332 pages
Massimo Dell’Utri
REFERENCES
Pietro SALIS, Pratiche discorsive razionali: Studi sull’inferenzialismo di Robert Brandom,
Milano-Udine, Mimesis, 2016, 332 pages
1 As  the  subtitle  reveals,  this  is  a  book  devoted  to  one  of  the  most  distinguished
philosophers of our time, Robert Brandom, a thinker whose importance for the debate
on  topics  such  as  meaning,  truth,  rationality,  objectivity,  agreement,  holism,
compositionality – to name just a few of them – is hardly deniable. Thousands among
articles and books have been dedicated in the last two decades to the evaluation of
Brandom’s thought, but still considerably few are the works in the Italian panorama
dedicated to him. In this respect, Pietro Salis’s book remedies this – and greatly so.
Indeed,  the  book  not  only  gives  us  a  perspicuous  illustration  of  a  multi-faceted
philosophical system, carefully showing how its many features combine together, but
highlights what turned out to be its controversial points, discussing them in full and
putting forward original solutions to them. An essential Brandom with improvements,
we might say. 
2 Accordingly, the book divides into two parts. The former lays down the foundations of
Brandom’s inferentialist program – based on the idea that the content of thoughts and
the meaning of sentences are a result of our inferential abilities and the social practices
these abilities engender. Not any inference is relevant in this respect,  though. Only
“materially good inferences” can serve the purpose of giving content and meaning to
our utterances,  because what we are talking about here are not just the inferences
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logically valid – the ones analyzed by logicians on a purely formal ground – but the
ones that can be considered good on the basis of the non-logical concepts they involve.
Moreover,  the  inferences  at  the  center  of  Brandom’s  system  are  nonmonotonic,  i.e.
inferences in which new premises  can affect  the validity  of  an argument involving
them. And this is another trait that distances this kind of inferences from the ones of
classical logic. Relying then on what he calls “Frege’s pragmatic principle” – according
to which when a person asserts a sentence, she commits herself to the truth of the
sentence, implicitly acknowledging that, if challenged, she must give a reason in favor
of her assertion – Brandom develops his celebrated illustration of the activity known as
“giving and asking for reasons.” This is a particular linguistic game in which a speaker,
for the sheer fact of making an assertion, takes a commitment before her (actual and
potential)  interlocutors:  the  commitment  towards  the  truth  of  the  assertion.  It
therefore follows that, if the speaker is able to give a justification for what she said,
then  she  gains  an  entitlement to  her  assertion.  In  their  turn,  commitments  and
entitlements determine a  score that  has to be assigned to the assertions in a  given
discursive  practice.  Salis  stresses  how  Brandom’s  is  a  systematic conception  of  the
human discursive practice, and how the special linguistic game of giving and asking for
reasons is  what  rationality  amounts  to.  This  is  what  allows Brandom to claim that
human rationality possesses an inherent pragmatic character.
3 The  first  part  of  the book  ends  with  an  explanation  of  what  the  notions  of
representation  and  reference  are  within  Brandom’s  inferentialist  framework.
According to Salis, here resides one of the most original features of the framework, in
that it does completely without primitive notions of reference, truth and representation
in the account of meaning and discursive practice, thereby setting itself against large
part of the received view – which is decidedly representationalist.  This is what makes
Brandom one of the leading anti-representationalist philosophers nowadays, arranging
the stage for a bold alternative explanation of the representational dimension of our
assertions:  “the  intentional  directionality  of  thought  and  language,  in  Brandom’s
perspective,  is  clarified  thanks  to  a  particular  de  re conception  of  propositional
attitudes  ascriptions”  (16).  This  is  particularly  important  considering  the  danger
inferentialism must avoid of putting human rationality on a mere linguistic basis, quite
irrespectively  of  the  world.  So,  let  us  briefly  see  what  this  de  re conception  of
propositional attitudes ascriptions amounts to, given that it is the central element in
Brandom’s  task  of  reconstructing  the  notions  of  representation  and  reference  on
expressivist grounds.
4 The just mentioned danger is quite clear to Salis. Indeed, he stresses how the notion of
materially  good  inference  is  not  enough  to  dispel  the  risk  of  subjectivism  and
relativism, since this kind of inference is based on the “perspectival character of the
individual epistemic and doxastic commitments” (96), and it is just that risk that that
perspectival character paves the way for. Relying on the well-known distinction Quine
drew  between  de  dicto (to  believe  that)  and  de  re (to  believe  of)  ascriptions  of
propositional attitudes, and having clarified that usually we use a de re ascription when
we want to make explicit an implicit divergence between our commitments and the
ones made by our interlocutors, Brandom suggests “a methodical transformation of the
(referentially  opaque)  de  dicto ascriptions  into  the  (referentially  transparent)  de  re
ascriptions by means of which differentiate one’s own commitments from the others’
via the reference to factual data” (103). This transformation is particularly useful in
cases  of  misunderstandings  and ambiguities:  it  is  in  cases  like  these  that  the  de  re
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ascriptions  can  make  explicit  what  a  speaker’s  statement  is  about,  clarifying
commitments and entitlements and updating the deontic score. Accordingly,  such a
transformation is able to guarantee a satisfactory foothold for the evaluation of our
arguments, because it would place our assertions within a verifiable – thus debatable –
domain.  The  description  of  the  theoretical  link  connecting  the  de  re ascriptions  of
propositional attitudes to the inferentialist conception of meaning – a link centered on
the key notion of substitution – is one of the greatest merits of Salis’s analysis.
5 The second part of the book contains four essays on some hotly debated topics linked to
inferentialism:  Brandom’s  version  of  alethic  deflationism,  the  relationship  between
inferentialism and semantic holism, its relationship to compositionality, and the notion
of objectivity. All the essays aim at defending Brandom’s stance, and they manage to do
this by means of what proves to be interesting original arguments.
6 Just to give an example of how hotly these topics are debated, let us give a quick look at
Brandom’s understanding of truth and what a possible qualm may be raised about it.
Salis  introduces  it  in  the  course  of  his  account  of  the  difference  which  separates
Brandom’s inferentialism from Michael Dummett’s justificationism. As is well-known,
Dummett advanced a fierce criticism to the traditional non-epistemic conception of
truth  (and  so  does  Brandom),  claiming  that  it  is  useless  in  order  to  explain  how
speakers  grasp  the  meaning  of  the  linguistic  expression  they  use.  Truth  must  be
something that we epistemically master, according to Dummett, and subscribing to an
epistemic  conception  of  truth  led  him  to  embrace  anti-realism,  given  that  in  his
perspective what reality amounts to follows from our demonstrative and justificatory
abilities.  Brandom,  however,  opts  for  alethic  deflationism,  an  option  opposed  to
Dummett’s  –  because  alethic  deflationism  utterly  denies  that  truth  can  be  an
“explanatory” concept, thereby denying that, e.g., it can enter in an explanation of the
meaning  of  linguistic  expressions.  Salis  illustrates  the  features  that  differentiate
Brandom’s from other varieties of alethic deflationism – Brandom’s is a version of the
so-called prosentential  theory of  truth:  anaphoric  deflationism.  Among these features
there is “maintaining a dimension that transcends the subjective and intersubjective
acknowledgment of what is true” (128): this would allow the prosentential theory of
truth to save a typical realist intuition, i.e. the idea according to which the way things
stand might be independent from what we know or can in principle know about them.
Indeed, philosophers endorsing the prosentential theory deem it “possible to clearly
and explicitly distinguish the dimension of truth from that of justification” (128). This
is revealed by sentences that have the same circumstances of application, but different
consequences of application. It is correct to assert “I will marry Ophelia” in the same
circumstances in which it is correct to assert “I believe I will marry Ophelia,” so that
both share the same justifications for their assertion, but a priori they do not have the
same consequences of  application. If  Ophelia unfortunately died in a week or so,  the
former  sentence  would  be  false,  whereas  the  latter  would  still  be  adequate  in  the
moment  it  was  uttered.  And  this,  according  to  Salis,  shows the  transcendental
character  of  “true”  in  respect  of  “justified”:  “the  only  justifications  supporting  an
assertion are not sufficient to account for its meaning” (129) and truth – contrary to
Dummett.
7 Now, I think that the transcendental dimension is a very important feature of truth
that, however, the prosententialists are unable to give an account for. This happens
because the prosentential theory of truth (and alethic deflationism in general) is neutral
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toward that transcendental dimension. If Brandom manages to explain this dimension,
as he does, it is thanks to his particular version of inferentialism. It is inferentialism
that helps making a distinction between the justifications an assertion can currently
have and the justifications it can have in principle,  as Salis himself beautifully shows
elsewhere in the book.  The inferential  role  of  a  sentence S,  according to Brandom,
“does  not  simply  boil  down  to  the  justifications  Js for  S,  but  extends  also  to  its
consequences  Cs”  (124):  we  may  discover  in  the  future  that  the  inferences  we  are
accustomed to use regarding S are different, and find ourselves in the need of changing
our  inferential  use  of  S.  This  suffices  to  speak  of  a  realist  character  of  Brandom’s
inferentialism. After all Brandom himself, Salis recalls, applies the term “conceptual
realism”  to  the  metaphysical  position  stemming  from  his  inferentialism:  “the  idea
according to which reality is already conceptually structured, and our knowledge of
reality extends so far as our grasp of the concepts that we use in order to describe and
understand  it  finds  a  space”  (124;  cf.  also  198).  So,  it  is  inferentialism,  not
prosententialism, that possesses the necessary resources to do justice to the “structural
gap between truth and justification” (129). Of course, this gap should be recognized at
the  level  of  truth  as  well,  and  failing  to  do  this  might  reveal  a  weak  spot  in
prosententialism.
8 However, Salis may have a rejoinder to this. Since truth is – as we may sensibly claim –
the most objective concept we have, and since the final chapter of the book is devoted
to  the  task  of  averting  the  charge  of  subjectivism  that  might  be  raised  toward
Brandom’s inferentialism, an argument in favor of the suitability of prosententialism
for vindicating the realist character of truth may derive from the arguments of that
final chapter. So let us see what Salis says on behalf of Brandom there.
9 The  challenge  facing  inferentialism  (the  one  we  have  been  considering  above)  is
something Brandom is quite aware of, and “becomes to say how the commitments and
entitlements involved can be understood to have conceptual contents that are objective
in the sense of not reducing to what someone or everyone is committed or entitled to”
(Brandom, Reply to Bob Hale and Crispin Wright’s “Assertibilist Truth and Objective Content,” 
in B.  Weiss & J.  Wanderer (eds),  Reading Brandom:  On Making It  Explicit,  Milton Park,
Routledge,  2010,  361).  Meeting  this  challenge  would  then  suffice  to  show  that
inferentialism can intelligibly distinguish between “being right and merely believing
one is right” (194), making enough room for a notion of objectivity that does not come
down to intersubjectivity – let alone subjectivism. Salis’s strategy is ingenious: he starts
admitting that not only the subjectivist danger is facilitated by the perspectival nature
of  speakers’  commitments,  but  it  is  even  worsened  by  the  nonmonotonic  and
counterfactually  robust  character  of  material  inference  itself.  Indeed,  what  this
character  brings  about  are  strong  epistemic  asymmetries among  participants  in  the
discursive practice, due to the contribute of a specialist nature made by experts within
that practice, which gives rise to an imbalance among the commitments participants
undertake.  Therefore,  Salis  notices,  at  first  blush  Brandom’s  deontic  scorekeeping
model might appear epistemically inadequate, since those asymmetries seem to require
additional expressive resources. As a matter of fact, however, this is not the case: on
closer inspection, the purported additional expressive resources turn out to be internal
to the dynamic of the game of giving and asking for reasons. From this more refined
perspective,  both the afore-mentioned asymmetries  and the imbalance they trigger
guarantee an expressive surplus to the discursive interactions in the practice, showing
the  existence  of  a  transcendental  notion  of  objectivity  functioning  as  a  sort  of
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regulative ideal of epistemic progress. But – and this is the chief point made by Salis –
since this transcendental idea of objectivity is structurally embedded in the discursive
practice, Brandom’s model appears to be “perfectly capable of reaching the very idea of
objectivity” (207), defeating once and for all the charge of subjectivism.
10 How could all this have an impact on Brandom’s notion of truth? It seems to me that
whether  or  not  the  idea  of  objectivity  stemming  from  the  discursive  practice  is
attributable to truth itself remains controversial, and so remains the further question
regarding whether or not this move would be tantamount to recognize an explicative
nature to truth, not only an expressive one. However, what is certain is that Salis’s
book is a great contribution to the debate on this and other deep topics currently at the
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